In developing the theory of long-run competitive equilibrium (LRCE), Marshall (1890) used the notion of a representative firm. The identity of this firm, however, remained unclear, and subsequent theory focused on the case where all firms are identical. Using Hopenhayn's (1992) model of competitive industry dynamics, we extend the theory of LRCE to account for heterogeneous firms and show that the long-run supply function can indeed be characterized as the solution to the minimization of a representative average cost function. We also highlight that famous principles of competitive markets, such as efficiency of the LRCE allocation, are not robust to heterogeneity.
Introduction
The theory of long-run competitive equilibrium (LRCE), first developed by Marshall in his Principles of Economics (1890), has had a profound influence on our understanding of competitive markets. One distinguishing feature of Marshall's theory is his conceptualization of the (long-run) industry supply function. Pigou (1928) , Viner (1953) [1931] and others subsequently formalized Marshall's notion of LRCE. The latter author, in particular, is credited for popularizing the typical diagram taught in introductory courses and reproduced in Figure 1 . The figure represents an industry with fixed input prices where all firms are identical and characterized by the marginal (MC) and average (AC) cost functions depicted in the left panel. In an LRCE, price is at the minimum point of the AC function, p e , and aggregate quantity is given by the demand function evaluated at that price, Q e 0 . Suppose that there is a shift of the (inverse) demand function from P Figure  1 . In the short run, the number of firms stays fixed, so price and quantity increase from the original LRCE at point A to the new short-run equilibrium at point B, a movement occurring along the short-run supply function S 0 . But then firms make positive (economic) profits, and these profits attract additional firms into the market.
In the long-run, the new LRCE is at point C, where all firms make zero profits at price p e and aggregate production increases to Q e 1 . Thus, the (long-run) industry supply function, S LR , is horizontal at the minimum of the average cost function, p e .
tative firm. While Marshall recognized that there are different firms in an industry, subsequent developments have focused on the case where all firms are identical in a long-run equilibrium. Viner (1953) [1931] , pg. 222, justifies this view:
"If there are particular units of the factors which retain permanently advantages in value productivity over other units of similar factors, these units, if hired, will have to be paid for in the long-run at differential rates proportional to their value productivity, and if employed by their owner should be charged for costing purposes with the rates which could be obtained for them in the open market and should be capitalized accordingly."
Viner's argument may justify why firms do not make rents in the presence of markets that bid up the price of advantageous factors, such as exceptional managerial ability. But the argument does not imply that firms with different technologies or productivities cannot coexist in equilibrium. A realistic feature of an industry is that low-productivity firms can potentially become high-productivity firms and vice versa.
This feature implies that equilibrium will be characterized both by coexistence of heterogeneous firms and turnover (entry and exit), and it does not seem appropriate to exclude these realistic features from a theory of LRCE.
Our objective in this paper is to go back to Marshall's original motivation and to extend the classical theory of LRCE to the case of heterogeneous firms. Fortunately, we don't have to formulate a new model, since Hopenhayn (1992) actually introduced and studied a model of competitive industry dynamics where firms' productivities evolve over time and exit and entry is an equilibrium phenomenon. We take the steady-state equilibrium in Hopenhayn's model as the natural extension of the theory of LRCE to the case with heterogeneous firms. Hopenhayn (1992) , however, did not link his work to the early theory on LRCE, and our contribution is to fill-in this gap.
Our main result is that the (long-run) industry supply function with heterogeneous firms can indeed be characterized as the solution to the minimization of a representative average cost function, as Marshall originally envisioned. The standard textbook case, depicted in Figure 1 , is just a special case where there is no firm heterogeneity.
There are several reasons to care about this result. First, it formalizes Marshall's original motivation of a representative firm and of the industry supply function in the presence of heterogeneous firms. Second, it provides a connection between the early literature on LRCE and the modern literature on industry dynamics (to be reviewed below). Third, it makes the model of LRCE with heterogeneous firms accessible to a larger audience (in particular, the example in Section 2.2 conveys much of the intuition and can be taught in introductory courses). Finally, it helps highlight that some famous principles of competitive markets are not robust to the inclusion of firm heterogeneity. We illustrate this last point by showing that aggregate surplus is generally not maximized in an LRCE with heterogeneous firms.
Our paper links the classic theory of LRCE, which does not explicitly model dynamics, with the modern literature on competitive industry dynamics started by Lucas (1967) . Lucas and Prescott (1971) developed the first theory of dynamic competitive equilibrium with stochastic demand, costly capital stock adjustments, and correct (i.e., "rational") expectations about future prices. The theory, however, assumes that firms are identical and that there is no entry and exit. Subsequent developments incorporated both firm heterogeneity and entry and exit, at the expense of no longer studying the dynamics of capital accumulation. Jovanovic (1982) developed the first of such models. Each period, a firm draws a productivity shock from a distribution that depends on an unknown productivity type. Firms have different productivity types and, as they learn their own type, more productive firms stay and less productive firms exit. The objective of these papers was to study the dynamic evolution of a competitive industry, not the steady state. Consequently, all of the interesting action happens outside the steady state and, indeed, there is no entry and exit in the steady state of these models. Hopenhayn (1992) was the first one to consider a model with both heterogeneous firms and entry and exit in the steady state. In contrast to Jovanovic's model, firms know their productivity types, but productivity types evolve randomly in such a way that firms that have a low productivity today can have a high productivity tomorrow and vice versa. As mentioned earlier, this is the model that we will use to formalize Marshall's idea that the LRCE of a competitive industry is characterized by the cost function of a representative firm.
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For brevity, we focus on the case where input prices are fixed, which implies that the long-run industry supply function is horizontal. The extension to the case of input prices that increase with aggregate quantity was controversial in the early literature-see Opocher and Steedman (2008) for an insightful historical account. The initial approach, by Pigou (1928) , Viner (1953 Viner ( )[1931 , and others, considered a cost function that depends both on individual and aggregate quantity. Subsequent literature (e.g., Kaldor (1934) , Allen et al. (1938), and Hicks (1946) )) criticized this reduced-form approach because of lack of microfoundations. For either approach, the extension of our result is straightforward: A given aggregate quantity leads to a given equilibrium input price and, fixing this input price, the LRCE price is still the minimum point on a representative average cost function. The long-run industry (inverse) supply function is simply the mapping from aggregate quantities to these minimum points. In particular, the aggregate supply function may be increasing if input prices increase with aggregate quantity.
Model and illustrative example

Setup
We adopt Hopenhayn's (1992) infinite-horizon model of a competitive industry with a continuum of potential firms, each of which can produce a homogenous product at total cost C(q, θ) where q is the quantity produced,
type, and θ L < θ H . Each period t = 1, 2, ..., product demand is given by Q d (p), where p ≥ 0 is the output price. Firms take price as given and choose quantity to maximize profit. There is also an infinite mass of potential entrants with discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] who can decide to enter the market and become a firm. A potential entrant does not know her type, but knows that her type is independently distributed according to the probability measure ν ∈ ∆(Θ). A firm entering the market pays a one-time entry cost of κ ≥ 0. After paying this cost, a firm immediately learns its own type. Thereafter, types evolve independently across firms according to the probability measure
where θ is the current type. At the end of the period, each firm makes an exit decision knowing their current, but not future, type. There is also an exogenous exit probability ρ. A firm that exits the market (endogenously or exogenously) does so permanently and obtains a payoff of zero.
We maintain the following assumptions. Assumption 2. Costs: For all θ ∈ Θ: C(·, θ) is continuously differentiable, with
For all q ≥ 0, C(q, ·) is increasing.
Assumption 3. Order over types: For any
Assumption 4. The exogenous probability of exit is positive, i.e., ρ > 0.
Assumption 5. Measures over types: (i) ν has a continuous probability density function (pdf ), f ν (·), with support equal to Θ; (ii) For all θ:
with support equal to Θ, and (θ
Assumption 1 implies the existence of a downward sloping inverse demand function,
. Assumption 2 implies existence and uniqueness of an optimal quantity
The assumption also implies that the profit function
is nonincreasing in θ, and decreasing for (p, θ) such that q(p, θ) > 0. Note also that each firm has a fixed cost C(0, θ) which is sunk once the firm decides to enter or stay in the industry.
Assumption 3 postulates a first-order stochastic dominance relationship across types, so that higher types today are more likely to become higher types tomorrow.
Assumption 4 guarantees that the life span of a firm is almost surely finite; in particular, if there is no entry, then there must be zero aggregate production in equilibrium. This assumption is made for simplicity, puts the focus on equilibria with positive entry, and allows us to include the special case where firms' types are permanent.
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Assumption 5 lists technical conditions regarding the measures over types.
2 Hopenhayn (1992) instead assumes that ρ = 0 and guarantees finite lifespan with an additional recurrence condition on F . He then restricts attention to equilibria with positive entry.
Assumption 6 is made for simplicity. It rules out equilibria with zero aggregate production by requiring that even the highest-cost firm prefers to enter whenever price equals the maximum willingness to pay, v.
The expected net present discounted value of a firm of type θ who faces (steadystate) price p every period is
Assumption 3 and the fact that
is decreasing. Therefore, the optimal exit decision in steady state is characterized by a marginal type m ∈ Θ with the property that all lower types stay and all higher types exit the market. Let µ(n, m) denote the steady-state measure of types of firms given the mass of entrants n ≥ 0 and the marginal type m ∈ Θ. In particular, for any Borel set A ⊆ Θ,
The assumption that ρ > 0 guarantees existence of a steady-state measure.
The corresponding aggregate supply at price p is
Definition 1. A tuple p e , n e , m e is a long-run competitive equilibrium (LRCE)
if the following conditions are satisfied:
(ii) Unlimited entry:´Θ V (p e , θ)ν(dθ) ≤ κ, with equality if n e > 0.
An LRCE captures the steady state of the dynamic competitive industry.
3 The first condition requires market clearing and already incorporates the assumption of profit maximization. The second condition requires the net present value of entry to equal the entry cost if the mass of entrants is positive. It is known as the "free entry" condition, but we reserve that terminology for the case in which entry is actually free, i.e., κ = 0. The third condition requires the marginal type to be indifferent between staying or exiting the market, provided it is an interior type.
Lemma 1. In any LRCE, both aggregate production and entry must be positive.
Proof. Suppose p e is an LRCE price and
By the fact that π(p, θ) is nondecreasing in p and nonincreasing in θ and by Assumption 6,
that p e does not satisfy the entry condition (ii) in Definition 1, contradicting the fact that p e is an LRCE price. Therefore, Q d (p e ) > 0 and by condition (i) in Definition 1,
; n e , m e ) > 0, which then implies, by the assumption that ρ > 0, that n e > 0.
Definition 2. The long-run industry (inverse) supply function is a function Q → P s LR (Q) with the property that, for any Q > 0, p = P s LR (Q) is the unique price satisfying the following conditions for some w > 0, m ∈ Θ, and n > 0:
The next result follows immediately from the definitions and from Lemma 1's implication that the entry condition in Definition 2 holds with equality in equilibrium. 
Proposition 1 simply says that the LRCE price is such that supply equals demand. When firms are identical, it is well known that the long-run industry supply function is horizontal at the minimum point of the average cost function. Our objective is to characterize this function for the environment described in this section, where firms are heterogeneous.
A simple example
We discuss an example with three objectives in mind: It is simple enough to be taught in introductory courses, it conveys much (but not all) of the intuition behind our results, and it is sufficient to see that standard properties of LRCE with homogeneous firms do not extend to heterogeneous firms. We assume that: (i) there are only two types, not a continuum, θ H > θ L ≥ 0, and each type is equally likely to be drawn by an entrant; (ii) C(q, θ) = c(q) + θ, so that a firm's type represents its fixed cost and all firms have the same marginal cost MC(q) ≡ c ′ (q); (iii) the entry cost is zero, κ = 0; (iv) types are permanent, so that a firm keeps the type it draws upon entry for its entire lifetime; and (v) firms are impatient, δ < 1. The variable cost function c(·) satisfies the following conditions:
steady-state measure of types. It is easy to see that type θ L will stay and type θ H will exit in equilibrium; in particular, we will drop m from the notation.
4 The steady-state mass of firms of type θ L , denoted by µ L , is determined by the steady-state mass of entrants, n, as follows:
The RHS of equation (3) is the sum of the mass of entrants of type θ L , n/2, and the mass of firms of type θ L that were already present and did not exit exogenously,
The equation implies that, in steady state, the mass of type θ L remains constant. For firms of type θ H , who never stay for more than one period, their mass is half the mass of entrants. Thus, the steady-state masses of firms of each type as a function of the mass of entrants, n, are
long-run industry supply function. The conditions in the definition of the long-run supply function become:
Condition (i) requires aggregate output supply to equal Q. Condition (ii) requires that the net present value of an entrant is zero. With probability 1/2, a firm is of type θ L and remains in the market until it has to exogenously exit, thus expecting a net present value of π(p, θ L )/(1 − δ(1 − ρ)). With probability 1/2, a firm is of type θ H , makes profit π(p, θ H ), and exits the market.
The weights on the profit functions of each type in the free-entry condition have an intuitive interpretation. The weight
is equal to the steady-state mass of type θ L , normalized by the mass of entrants n, in a hypothetical world where firms, instead of exiting with probability ρ, exit with probability 1 − δ(1 − ρ).
5 The hypothetical and actual probabilities of exit coincide as δ → 1, and so the weight asymptotically equals the actual, normalized steady-state mass of type θ L . Similarly, the weight Λ H ≡ 1/2 on π(p, θ L ) is equal to the normalized steady-state mass of firms of type θ H (here, δ is irrelevant because type θ H exits with probability 1). Thus, the net present value of entry can be written as
By equation (4), the solution p e to NP V (p e ) = 0 satisfies
where Λ ≡ (Λ L , Λ H ), AC(q, θ) ≡ C(q, θ)/q is the average cost of type θ, and q → AC e (q, Λ) is a weighted average cost function.
By profit maximization, p e = MC(q(p e )), and so (5) implies that p e equalizes marginal and weighted average cost,
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates how to find p e . The figure plots the marginal cost function common to all types, MC(·), the average cost function for each type, AC(·, θ), and the weighted average cost function AC e (·, Λ). The zero-profit price p e is given by the intersection of the marginal cost and weighted average cost functions, and
Figure 2: Long-run competitive equilibrium in the example.
this intersection occurs at the minimum point on the weighted average cost function. Finally, it is straightforward to check that, since p e > 0, there exists n(Q) > 0 satisfying condition (i) in Definition 2, i.e., Q = (µ L (n(Q)) + µ H (n(Q)))q(p e ). Therefore, the long-run supply function exists and is horizontal at the price that minimizes the weighted average cost function AC e (·). Thus, provided that P d (0) > p e , there exists a unique LRCE where price is p e and the mass of entrants n e is such that the product market clears, i.e.,
Figure 2 also illustrates that aggregate profits are strictly positive in an LRCE.
The equilibrium profit of the average firm is π e ≡ (p e − AC * (q e min ))q e min > 0, where q e min is the quantity produced by each firm and
is the per-unit cost function of the average firm producing in equilibrium. The weights in AC * (·) correspond to the steady-state proportion of firms of each type. While these 6 For a proof that the intersection occurs at the minimum point of AC e (·, Λ), note that the first order condition for the problem min q AC e (q, Λ) is precisely the condition M C(q) = AC e (q, Λ). Moreover, the second order condition is satisfied because c ′′ (q) > 0 for all q > 0. 7 The solution is unique and given by n e = Q d (p e )/((1/2ρ + 1/2)q e min ).
weights converge to Λ as δ → 1, for the case δ < 1, AC * (·) puts more weight on the low cost type relative to AC e (·, Λ). Intuitively, the selection in exit implies that the steady-state composition of firms is tilted towards low-cost firms relative to the exante perception of a potential entrant who discounts the future. Thus, while potential entrants make zero profits ex-ante, the actual firms operating in the steady state make strictly positive profits. The result that profits are strictly positive in an LRCE changes many of the implications of the textbook model of LRCE, such as the idea that 100% of the incidence from tax policy must fall on the demand side, or the idea that benefits from a subsidies must accrue exclusively to the owner of a fixed input factor, or the idea that aggregate surplus is maximized in equilibrium. In this example, a planner who wishes to maximize steady-state surplus prefers a higher aggregate quantity Q * , a lower quantity per firm q * min , and a higher mass of entrants n * compared to the LRCE quantities Q e , q e min , and n e . Of course, the planner's preferred outcome is not an equilibrium outcome, because the net present value of entry would be negative and firms would not enter to begin with. In the special case where there is a single type, θ L = θ H , the standard textbook results hold: The industry supply function is horizontal at the price that equals the minimum of the average cost function (all firms have the same cost function), each firm makes zero profits, and aggregate surplus is maximized in an LRCE (irrespective of the value of the discount factor δ). Alternatively, we can interpret the standard textbook model as a case where firms are of different types but know their types before entering the market. In that case, only firms of type θ L will operate in the market in an LRCE.
beyond the simple example. We extend the logic in the example in several directions. First, marginal costs may differ by type. We will tackle this case by expressing the average cost function in terms of price, not quantity. Second, types may be non-permanent. When types follow a more general Markov process, optimal entry decisions are the solution to a non-trivial dynamic optimization problem. We will use results from the theory of bounded linear operators to show that, nevertheless, ex-ante expected profits can still be expressed as the weighted average of the profits of each type. Third, there may be a continuum of types. In this case, exit decisions will no longer be trivially characterized and we will see, for example, that exit decisions are also inefficient from the perspective of a planner who wants to maximize aggregate equilibrium surplus. Fourth, strictly positive entry costs need to be incorporated into the definition of average cost.
Characterization of long-run industry supply
To state the main result, we first define an average weighted cost function. Letting M(Θ) be the space of finite Borel measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue, we defineC :
for all p ≥ 0 and η ∈ M(Θ). This is the weighted cost with respect to a measure η.
The corresponding average weighted cost function is then defined bȳ
8 In the case where marginal costs are identical, the average weighted cost coincides with the weighted average cost, as in the example, but this is not true in general. Next, for each n, m, and δ, we define µ E (n, m, δ) ∈ M(Θ) to be the steady-state measure of types of firms when the mass of entrants is n, firms survive with exogenous probability δ(1 − ρ), and surviving firms exit endogenously if their type is lower than m ∈ Θ, i.e., for any Borel set A ⊆ Θ,
For the special case of δ = 1, µ E (n, m, 1) = µ(n, m) is the actual steady-state measure of types defined in equation (2), because in the model firms survive with exogenous probability 1 − ρ, not δ(1 − ρ).
Finally, since µ E is linear in n, we define the normalized mass
We now state the main result.
Theorem 1. The long-run industry supply function exists and it is given, for any Q > 0, by
Theorem 1 extends the textbook characterization of the long-run supply function to a setting with heterogeneous firms. The long-run supply function is horizontal at a price that minimizes the average weighted cost function, where the minimum is with respect to both price and the marginal type. The average weight cost function is constructed using the measure Λ(m, δ), which can be viewed as the normalized steady-state cross-sectional distribution of firm types in a hypothetical world where firms survive with exogenous probability δ(1−ρ) and surviving firms exit endogenously if their type is lower than m.
In particular, Theorem 1 formalizes Marshall's notion of a representative firm as a hypothetical firm with average cost functionĀC. In the special case where all firms have identical marginal cost functions (as in the example), the average cost function of the representative firm,ĀC, corresponds to a weighted average of the average cost functions.
Corollary 1. There exists a unique LRCE and it is characterized by positive entry and positive aggregate production.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 1, Theorem 1, and the fact that assumption 6 and monotonicity of π(·, θ) imply that min p,mĀ C(p, Λ(m, δ)) < v.
Proof of Theorem 1
We will show that there is a unique solution (p e , m e ) to conditions
in Definition 2, and that this solution satisfies
The proof has three steps. Throughout the proof, we let ̺ ≡ δ(1 − ρ).
where
In words, V m differs from the value function V defined in equation (1) in that it forces a possibly suboptimal exit decision threshold m. Consider the system of equations:
We will show that we can work with the system of equations (ii')-(iii') rather than (ii)-(iii).
Lemma 2. If (p, m) is the unique solution to (ii')-(iii'), then (p, m) must also be the unique solution to (ii)-(iii).
Proof. Let (p, m) be the unique solution to (ii')-(iii'). In particular, m is the unique solution to (iii') given p. Let m 0 be the optimal exit threshold given p. In particular,
Since m is the unique solution to (iii') given p, it follows that m = m 0 and, therefore,
In addition, by optimality of m 0 and the one-shot deviation principle,
step 2. In this step, we will show that conditions (ii')-(iii') can be equivalently expressed using weighted profit functions. This is one of the main insights of the proof and it relies on the concept of the adjoint of a bounded operator to identify the appropriate weight over profit functions.
gives the measure of types that results from applying the Markov operator F to current types that are below the marginal type m, when the measure of current types is η.
The next result collects two useful properties of the operator Φ m . Proof. See the Appendix.
Using the operator Φ m , µ E can be alternatively written as
Analogously, we can define µ X (n, m, δ) ∈ M(Θ) as the same measure, except that the distribution of entrants is the one facing the marginal exit type, F (· | m), i.e.,
By Lemma 3(i),
and
Our goal is to show that we can express the value functions in terms of weighted profit functions, with weights Λ and Λ X for the entry and exit conditions, respectively. For this purpose, we define the weighted profit functionπ : [0, ∞)×M(Θ) → R, wherē
for all p ≥ 0 and η ∈ M(Θ). We then state the following two conditions, which the next lemma will show to be equivalent to conditions (ii')-(iii').
Lemma 4. (p, m) solves (ii')-(iii') if and only if it solves (ii")-(iii").
Proof. By repeatedly applying equation (7), it follows that
where the second line follows because Φ 
step 3. We conclude the proof by showing that the solution to (ii")-(iii") is unique and minimizes the average weighted cost function.
Lemma 5. There is a unique (p e , m e ) satisfying conditions (ii")-(iii"), and it is characterized by {(p e , m e )} = arg min The reason why the two schedules in Figure 3 intersect at the minimum point of the zero entry-profit schedule is as follows. Consider a point (p,m) on the zero entry-profit schedule such thatm < m e . This point lies above the zero exit-profit schedule; that is,π(p, Λ X (m, δ)) > 0, and so the marginal typem makes a strictly positive profit. If the marginal type were slightly increased fromm tom + ε, then a potential entrant would get to stay whenever drawing a type in (m,m + ε). By continuity, its profit from having a type in the interval would be positive, and so the firm's ex-ante profit would increase from zero to a strictly positive number. The price would then need to fall in order to remain on the zero entry-profit schedule. Thus, the zero entry-profit schedule is decreasing whenever it is above the zero exit-profit schedule. By a similar argument, the zero entry-profit is increasing whenever it is below the zero exit-profit schedule.
Equilibrium surplus
We conclude by comparing the equilibrium allocation with the allocation that maximizes steady-state aggregate surplus. We focus on the interesting case where m e = θ L , so that not all firms exit in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Consider an LRCE such that m e = θ L . Then the equilibrium allocation maximizes steady-state surplus if and only if δ = 1. Moreover, if δ < 1, aggregate quantity is strictly lower and each firm's individual quantity is weakly higher in the LRCE, compared to the surplus-maximizing, allocation.
Proof. A planner who wishes to maximize steady-state surplus must equalize marginal costs across all firms. Letting p be this common marginal cost, the planner's problem
subject to Q =q(p, Λ(m, 1))n. Substituting the constraint and using the definition of AC, the problem becomes
It is immediate that the planner's solution is (p * , m * ) = min p,mĀ C(p, Λ(m, 1)) and 1) ). By Theorem 1, the planner's solution coincides with the LRCE allocation for δ = 1.
For the second part, let p 
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that future payoffs are strictly positive (since m e 1 > θ L and ν has full support) and the equality follows from the zero-profit equilibrium condition. Since V 2 (·, θ) is nondecreasing, it follows that p e 2 < p e 1 . The second part of the claim then follows by setting δ 2 = 1 and applying the first part.
Intuitively, the firms' entry problem is a problem of experimentation. Firms don't know their types ex-ante and, once they enter, they have the potential to become more productive over time. A long-lived planner who is more patient than the firms puts a higher value on entry because lower productivity firms exit and, in the long-run, only the more productive firms will remain in the industry. As Proposition 2 shows, the case of a planner who cares about long-run surplus is an extreme case where the planner is essentially infinitely patient. The divergence in discount factors implies that, under such planner, the steady state will be characterized by more productive firms, higher aggregate production, and higher consumer surplus, resulting in a higher overall aggregate steady-state surplus. This is not true, however, in the standard textbook model where firms are homogeneous and there is free entry.
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We are not necessarily advocating for a planner who cares only about the steady state, although we note that, as Proposition 2 highlights, this is the implicit assumption whenever researchers focus on long-run equilibrium outcomes, which is a common approach.
10 More generally, it does make sense for a long-lived planner, such as an antitrust authority, to have a higher discount factor than the firms. In that case, Proposition 2 continues to hold, as illustrated by Figure 4 . As the discount factor increases from δ to δ ′ > δ, both the zero entry-profit and the zero exit-profit schedules characterized in the proof of Theorem 1 move to the right. The former does so strictly and the latter does so weakly in the special case of permanent types, and strictly in all other cases. Consequently, a planner who is more patient than the firms always wants the price to be lower than the LRCE price, meaning that he wants higher aggregate production. The effect on exit is, however, ambiguous, as it depends on how much each of the schedules shifts relative to the other one. It is always the case, however, that the planner wants to encourage firms to stay more than desired at the planner's optimal price p * .
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Let L(M(Θ)) denote the space of linear bounded operators mapping M(Θ) to itself.
(i) Since ̺||Φ m || < 1 (here ||.|| is the operator norm 11 ), it is easy to see that the sequence (
It is easy to see that ̺Φ m S = S − I or, equivalently, (I − ̺Φ m )S = I; similarly S(I − ̺Φ m ) = I. Therefore, S is the inverse
and let η be any Borel measure of Θ. By Fubini's Theorem,
Expression (9) can be equivalently be cast as
, where ., . denotes the integral operation. Using this notation, it is easy to see that, for any j,
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Throughout this proof, we use the following properties for V m . The proof of these properties follow from standard fixed point arguments and are thus omitted: (1) For any m ∈ Θ, p → M[V m (p, .)](m) is nondecreasing and increasing over p such that
Before proving Lemma 5, we state and prove two preliminary results.
Lemma 6. For any p > 0 and any m ∈ Θ such thatπ(p,
11 The space M(Θ) is equipped with the total variation norm and the operator norm
≤ 1 where ||η|| T V ≡ 0.5´Θ |f η (θ)|dθ where f η is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of η with respect to Lebesgue.
Proof. Fix any θ ∈ Θ. We first show the result for m
≤ ̺ < 1, by the analogous arguments in the proof of Lemma 3,
We note that for any g(.
Hence, from this fact and the fact that A m ′ ,m (.) < 0, we can show inductively that for each j,
We now show the case for m ′ > m. Following the same steps as those above one
This observation and analogous derivations to the ones for m
Proof. We only prove continuity of (p, m) →π(p, Λ X (m)) since continuity of (p, m) → π(p, Λ(m)) is obtained by an analogous argument. By definition of V m , we want to
and note that, for sufficiently large n,
where C is some compact neighborhood of p. The second term in the RHS vanishes
is continuous (the proof follows from standard contraction mapping arguments and is omitted). Thus, the desired result follows by showing that the first term in the RHS vanish. To do this, note that for any θ ∈ Θ and any
since ̺ < 1, it suffices to show that there exists a δ > 0 such that lim sup n→∞ sup p∈C ||B mn,m,p || L ∞ = 0. To do this, we first show that for each θ, lim sup n→∞ sup p∈C |B mn,m,p (θ)| = 0. It is easy to show that there exists a K < ∞ such that
Thus, for any θ
By the DCT, this readily implies that for any θ ∈ Θ, lim sup n→∞ sup p∈C |B mn,m,p (θ)| = 0. We now show that lim sup n→∞ sup p∈C sup θ∈Θ |B mn,m,p (θ)| = 0. Since Θ is compact and we already established pointwise convergence, by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem it suffices to show that the family {sup p∈C |B mn,m,p (·)|} n∈N is equi-continuous. To do this, note that for any θ and θ ′ ,
The RHS is continuous by Assumption 5(ii), and its "modulus of continuity" does not
Proof of Lemma 5. Throughout the proof, we fix δ and omit it from the notation. We now define certain mappings that will be used throughout the proof. Let m → p E (m) ≡ {p :π(p, Λ(m)) = κ}, and p → m X (p) ≡ {m :π(p, Λ X (m)) = 0} and m → p X (m) = {p : m X (p) = m}. For the mapping m X , it is implicit that if π(p, Λ X (m)) < 0 then m X (p) = θ L and ifπ(p, Λ X (m)) > 0 then m X (p) = θ H . STEP 1. We now show that a solution to the system (ii')-(iii') exists and is unique and, moreover, we show that for any (m, p) such thatπ(p, Λ X (m)) = 0 and π(p, Λ(m)) = κ, then p < p E (m ′ ) for all m ′ = m, i.e., m is a global minimizer of the function p E .
Observe that by Assumption 5(i), ν ({C(0, θ) > 0}) > 0. Also, supp(Λ(m)) ⊇ supp(ν) for all m, so´C(0, θ)Λ(m)(dθ) > 0. This implies that ifq(p, Λ(m)) = 0, then π(p, Λ(m)) < 0 ≤ κ, so a (p, m) such thatq(p, Λ(m)) = 0 can never be a solution tō π(p, Λ(m)) = κ (if it exists). Therefore, if the solution exists it would be such that q(p, Λ(m)) > 0, in particular, this implies that p = 0 cannot be part of a solution.
Therefore, henceforth we focus on (p, m) such that Λ(m)({θ : q(p, w, θ) > 0}) > 0, in particular, we only consider m ∈ M ≡ {m ∈ Θ : ∃p : Λ(m)({θ : q(p, θ) > 0}) > 0}.
One of the following cases occurs: (a) p E − p X < 0; (b) p E − p X > 0 or (c) neither (a) nor (b) occurs (i.e., p E − p X changes signs at least once in Θ). If (a) occurs, then the solution to (ii')-(iii') exists and is given by m = θ L and p such thatπ(p, Λ(m)) = κ andπ(m, Λ X (m)) < 0. Similarly, if (b) occurs, then the solution to (ii')-(iii') exists and is given by m = θ H and p such thatπ(p, Λ(m)) = κ andπ(m, Λ X (m)) > 0.
Therefore, if either (a) or (b) occurs a solution exists and is unique.
We now show that the same holds if (c) occurs. Clearly, for existence of a solution in this case it suffices that m → p X (m) is continuous (i.e., for any (m n ) n and (p n ) n such that m n → m and p n ∈ p X (m n ) with p n → p then p ∈ p X (m)) and closedand convex-valued; and that m → p E (m) is single-valued and continuous. Continuity of m → p X (m) follows from Lemma 7; and by continuity and monotonicity of for all m = m e . By step 1,
for all m ′ = m. Since, by our previous calculations in this step,ĀC(p E (m), Λ(m)) = p E (m) for all m, the desired result follows.
